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Case No. 20080043-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

Michael Duke Tanner,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from convictions on five counts of possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute, a first degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (West Supp. 2009).1 This Court has jurisdiction
under the pour-over provision of Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) (West 2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant's motion to
compel discovery?

1

The State cites to the current version of the relevant statutes except where
changes in the statutes may be relevant to the claims on appeal.

Standard of Review. This Court will reverse a decision to grant or deny
discovery only where the trial court has abused its discretion. See State v. Spry, 2001
UT App 75, f 8, 21 P.3d 675; State v. Knill, 656 P.2d 1026,1027 (Utah 1982),,
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, is reproduced in Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
For transactions occurring between October 3 and October 24,2006, the State
charged Defendant with five counts of distribution of a controlled substance, a first
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (West Supp. 2009).
All counts were alleged to have been committed in a drug free zone. See id.2
Defendant moved to compel the State to produce (1) a copy of the return of a
search warrant issued on October 18,2006, and executed at Defendant's residence
2

In the same information, for a February 3, 2007 incident, the State charged
two counts of possession of a controlled substance, a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 2009), and one count of
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37a-5 (West Supp. 2009). R27-25. Defendant moved to sever the February
possession counts from the October distribution counts. See R66-58. The State
agreed to the severance. See R66-58; R291:5; R292:3,5. After his trial and sentencing
on the distribution charges, Defendant pled guilty to a reduced charge on one of the
possession counts, and the State dismissed the other two counts. R284-79, 277-75.
Defendant did not reserve any right to appeal his conviction on the possession
count, and it is not properly the subject of this appeal. See id.

2

on October 25,2006; (2) a copy of "any and air probable cause affidavits in support
of any search warrant issued between January 2006 and January 2007 on
Defendant's residence and the return of the corresponding search warrant; (3) a
"text copy" of the Utah County Major Crimes Task Force procedure for controlled
buys, and (4) a "text copy" of the Utah County Major Crimes Task Force procedure
for using voluntary or paid confidential informants. R159-57; see also R294-93;
R297:15-19. The trial court denied the motion. R297:15-19.
Trial was held on the distribution charges, and a jury found Defendant guilty
on all five counts. See R200-198, 207-203; R288:234-38. The trial court sentenced
Defendant to five concurrent prison terms of five years to life. R263-62; see also
R277-75. Defendant timely appealed. R303.3
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The crime
Defendant sold methamphetamine to a confidential informant on five
different dates between October 3 and October 24, 2006. See R288:68-88,128-41.

3

The State was not able to locate the notice of appeal in the record transmitted
to this Court. The docket, however, indicates that the notice of appeal was filed on
January 11, 2008, and first supplemental index shows that it should be included in
the record at R303.

3

Additional facts
Mark Troxell is a Provo City police officer. R288:59-59. In October 2006 he
was assigned to the Utah County Major Crimes Task Force, supervising a team of
detectives conducting drug investigations. R288:59.
Troxell met Arthur Allred when Allred was referred to the task force by the
Utah County Attorney's Office in approximately July or August 2006. R288:64.
Troxell had not dealt with Allred before that time. Id. Allred told the Troxell that he
had information about Defendant's having sold methamphetamine. R288:65. He
said that he had been to Defendant's house and had purchased drugs from
Defendant. Id. He told Troxell that he could buy more drugs from Defendant. Id.
He gave Troxell an approximate address. Id. Troxell was familiar with the address.
Id.
Troxell then arranged to have Allred purchase drugs from Tanner. R288:66.
Troxell arranged for buys on October 3, 5,12,19, and 24, 2006. R288:66-89. After
Allred called Defendant to arrange for each drug purchase, Troxell and other task
force officers met Allred to give him "buy money" and to search him and his vehicle
to ensure that he had no drugs. Id. They also observed Allred drive to and enter
Defendant's residence. Id. After each buy, they met Allred at a nearby location
where he gave them the drugs. Id. The officers did not observe the actual
transactions, which occurred inside the residence. Id.
4

On October 18, 2006, Judge Samuel McVey signed a warrant authorizing a
search of Defendant's residence. R297:16. The warrant was executed on October 25,
one day following the last of Alfred's controlled buys. Id.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant has not adequately challenged the trial court's denial of his motion
to compel. In denying his first and second requests —for discovery of copies of
certain search warrants, their supporting affidavits, and the corresponding warrant
returns — the trial court concluded that they could not likely be found and that they
were not sufficiently relevant to require production. Defendant has not addressed
the trial court's determination that the documents were not likely available. Thus,
this Court need not address his challenge to the trial court's relevancy ruling, as an
alternative basis for the denying discovery—the unavailability of the documents —
survives to support the trial court's decision.
Moreover, to the extent Defendant challenges the denial of his third and
fourth requests —for discovery of "text copies" of the Major Crimes Task Force's
written procedures on working with confidential informants and conducting
controlled buys, he has not challenged the trial court's determination that those
documents did not exist. Thus, this Court need not address the Defendant's
challenge to the trial court's alternative grounds for denying discovery, i.e., that the
written procedures were not relevant to the matters before the court.
5

In any case, the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it denied
Defendant's motion asking the Court to compel the prosecutor to produce various
documents.

Defendant has not shown, as he must, that the prosecutor had

knowledge of the documents and that the documents would be exculpatory or were
needed to prepare a defense.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN
IT DENIED THE MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY
In his motion to compel discovery, Defendant sought four categories of
information:
1. A copy of the " Return of Search Warrant Affidavit for the Search
Warrant issued on October[] 18,2006 [and executed October 25,2006]
on the residence of 375 [W]est 300 North in Provo, Utah,"
2. A copy of any and all other Probable Cause Affidavits in Support
and Application for a Search Warrant and the Return of Search
Warrant Affidavits for the residence 375 [West] 300 North in Provo,
Utah between the dates of January 2006 and January 2007 ....
3. A text copy of the Utah County Major Crimes Task Force procedure
for controlled buys.
4. A text copy of the Utah County Major Crimes Task Force procedure
for using voluntary or paid confidential informants.

6

R159-58; see also R297:12-19.4 The trial court denied the motion. R297:15-19.
On appeal, Defendant claims that "the trial court erred in denying [his]
motion to compel discovery/' Br. Appellant at 12. He argues that the material
sought "was exculpatory" and "satisfied the good cause standard under [rule 16,
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure]." Id. at 14.
This Court should not review Defendant's claim, because he has not
adequately challenged the trial court's grounds for its ruling. In any event, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant's motion to compel, as
the prosecutor was not required to disclose any of the materials Defendant sought.
A. The trial court properly denied Defendant's motion asking
that the prosecutor be compelled to produce the return of the
search warrant executed October 25,2006.
Defendant first asked the trial court to compel the prosecutor to produce the
return of the search warrant executed October 25, 2006. R159. The trial court
properly exercised its discretion to deny that request. R297:16-17.
Background. At argument on Defendant's motion to compel, the parties
addressed the requested October 25 search warrant return. Defendant argued that
4

In his Statement of the Case, Defendant references several earlier discovery
requests. See Br. Appellant at 2-4. Only the requests made in his September 25,2007
motion to compel are relevant to this appeal.

7

the search warrant return was relevant to the credibility of Arthur Allred, the
confidential informant (CI). See R297:2-7. Defendant claimed that because no
charges were filed based on the October 25,2006 execution of the warrant, the police
may not have found drugs, the CI may therefore have lied about the presence of
drugs in the residence, and the CI may therefore have lied about other things, in
particular, about the drug transactions that were the bases for the charges in this
case. See id.
The prosecutor countered that, even assuming that no drugs were found
when the warrant was executed on October 25, that did not mean the CI had lied
when he swore that Defendant had sold him drugs at the residence on several
occasions in the three-week period before the search. See R297:13. The prosecutor
explained that Defendant could have sold the drugs, used the drugs, or hidden the
drugs. See id. The prosecutor also explained that he had tried, but failed, to locate
the warrant return. R297:16.
The court responded, "That's what I thought. So I'm not sure this Court has
one. If you haven't found it here, I don't know that we can find it either/' R297:17.
The court explained that the Fourth District did not, at the time the warrant was
issued and executed, have "an organized way" of retaining and filing warrants, the

8

affidavits upon which they were based, and the warrant returns. Id.5 The court
explained that there was a "real question" about "whether anybody can find a copy
of the return on the warrant." R297.16.
In addition, the court ruled that the return on warrant was not relevant to the
counts for which Defendant was tried. R297:17. The warrant was not executed until
the day after the final offense for which Defendant was being tried. See id. Thus, it
was not relevant to show what evidence had been developed with respect to the
charged crimes. See R297:13,17.
The court did not immediately address Defendant's claim that (a) if no
charges were filed, then perhaps no drugs were found, and (b) if no drugs were
found, perhaps Defendant lied when he swore that he had seen them on the
premises, and (c) if he lied in his affidavit, perhaps he lied when he told police that

5

The October 18 warrant was issued and executed just over a month before
the Utah Supreme Court rendered its decision in Anderson v. Taylor, 2006 UT 79,149
P.3d 352, which required "that magistrates issuing search warrants retain in their
custody copies of all search warrants issued, as well as the material supporting
search warrant applications, rather than surrendering to law enforcement the only
copies of such material." Id. at f 22. The Supreme Court also noted that "[although
the statute contemplates that law enforcement will return the warrant and related
materials to the magistrate, who will then deliver them to the court, magistrates in
the Fourth District 'typically instruct[ed] law enforcement to deliver the documents
to the court clerk for keeping/" Id. at f 17 n.3.

9

he received drugs from Defendant in the five controlled buys that were charged. See
R297:2-7. But, as explained below, the court later in its ruling set forth its reasoning
that an attempt to impeach on that basis would require calling a deputy county
attorney to explain why charges were not filed and that the probative value of any
evidence that might be elicited was outweighed by the danger of wasted time. See
R29718.
Surviving alternative basis for trial court's decision. When challenging a
court's decision on appeal, a defendant "must address all of the circumstances upon
which the court's decision was based." State v. Montiel, 2004 UT App 242, ^ 20, 95
P.3d 1216, affd, 2005 UT 48,122 P.3d 571. When the defendant challenges only some
of those bases, this Court "need not address whether the trial court erred in
considering th[ose] bas[e]s" because the other bases survive to support the trial
court's decision. State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801, 810 (Utah App. 1998); accord State v.
Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 1301 (Utah 1993); State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188, 192 (Utah
1990).
Here, Defendant has not adequately challenged the trial court's bases for its
ruling. His argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to
compel because the evidence sought was "potentially exculpatory or [constituted]
mitigation." Br. Appellant at 17. Thus, he challenges the trial court's determination
that the evidence was not sufficiently relevant. But the trial court denied the motion
10

for two reasons: first, it was not likely that the prosecutor or anyone else could find
the October 25 warrant return, and, second, Defendant had not shown that the
warrant return contained information that was exculpatory or so potentially
exculpatory that the prosecutor should be compelled to produce it. Defendant has
not mentioned, let alone addressed, the first basis for the trial court's denial of his
motion to compel Thus, an unchallenged alternative ground survives to support
the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to compel production of the October
25 warrant return.

Because Defendant has not challenged the trial court's

determination that the warrant return could not likely be found, this Court need not
address his claim that the evidence was exculpatory and necessary for the
preparation of his defense. See State v. Montiel, 2004 UT App 242, | 20; Baker, 963
P.2dat810.
Merits. In any case, the trial court properly denied Defendant's motion to
compel the prosecutor to produce the return of the warrant executed October 25.
Under rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, a "prosecutor shall disclose
to the defense upon request the following material or information of which he has
knowledge:... (4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of
the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense
for reduced punishment; and (5) any other item of evidence which the court

11

determines on good cause shown should be made available to the defendant in
order for the defendant to adequately prepare his defense/' Utah R. Crim. P. 16(a).
This rule requires the prosecutor to disclose upon request only those materials
of which he has knowledge. State v. Pliego, 1999 UT 8, If 9, 974 P.2d 279. Because
"[t]he knowledge of the prosecutor's staff and the investigating police officers is
imputed to the prosecutor, he must also disclose the materials of which they have
knowledge. Id. at f 12. But the rule "does not require [the prosecutor] to make an
investigation on behalf of the defendant, searching for exculpatory and mitigating
evidence/7 Id. at ^f 9 (citation omitted). And the prosecutor violates the rule "only
when he fails to disclose materials which he knows or should know contain
evidence that is exculpatory or that would otherwise be helpful to the defendant in
the preparation of his defense." Id. at f 12.
Here, the trial court properly exercised its discretion to deny Defendant's
motion to compel the prosecutor to produce the October 25 search return. The
prosecutor is required to produce only those materials of which he has knowledge.
See id. at f 9. The prosecutor had looked for, but could not find the document.
R297:16-17. Thus, he did not have the knowledge necessary to produce it.
Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that anyone could have found the return.
See R297:16-17. As explained, because of deficiencies in the court's filing system at

12

the time the warrant was executed, there was a "real question about "whether
anybody c[ould] find a copy of the return. R297:16-17.
In addition, Defendant had not shown that the search warrant return was
evidence that would tend to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt of the
defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense for reduced punishment. See Pliego,
1999 UT 8, Tf 12. Defendant's theory that the warrant return might be exculpatory
consisted of one speculation upon another. Defendant speculated that, because
Defendant was not charged with a crime based on anything found when the
warrant was executed on October 25, the return may have shown that no drugs
were found. See R297:2-5. And if no drugs were found, that might have meant that
the CI lied or was unreliable when he said in his October 18,2006 affidavit that they
were present. See id. And if he lied or was unreliable then, he might have lied or
been unreliable when he testified to Defendant's drugs sales in the three weeks that
preceded the October 25 search. See id.
But nothing in the record shows that Arthur Allred, the CI who conducted the
controlled buys, provided any information to support the warrant executed on
October 25,2006. And even if he did, the mere fact that charges were not filed does
not show that he lacked credibility. As the court explained, even though charges
were not filed, drugs may still have been found. "There are myriad[]... reasons for
which charges [might not] be filed." R297:18. Among them, a prosecutor may not
13

want to "burn [his] CI." Id. And, as explained above, even had the return shown
that drugs were not found, that would not have shown that Defendant lied when he
swore that he had seen drugs on the premises. Rather, it could have meant that
Defendant had used, sold, or hidden them. R297:17. Thus, any claim that the
documents would have been exculpatory would have been speculative. When
Defendant moved the court to compel the prosecution to produce the documents
associated with warrant issued October 18 and executed October 25, he was simply
asking for the opportunity to conduct a fishing expedition. The trial court did not
abuse its discretion by denying the motion. See State v. Knill, 656 P.2d 1026,1027-28
(Utah 1982) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied a
defense motion to produce evidence when that evidence "was no longer in the
possession of the State and when there was no showing of its evidentiary
significance to the defense").
Harmlessness. Finally, Defendant has not shown that he suffered any harm
as a result of the trial court's ruling. The October 25 warrant return was not
evidence that was needed by the defense to prepare its case. See Utah R. Evid.
16(a)(5). The Major Crimes Task Force began working with the CI when the CI
contacted the Force in July or August of 2006. R288:65. The CI provided
Defendant's name to Officer Scott Troxell. Id. Officer Troxellthen worked with the
CI and participated in setting up the controlled buys from Defendant. R288: 65-99.
14

Officer Troxell testified at trial about his work with the CI.

Id.

On cross-

examination, defense counsel could simply have asked Officer Troxell if the CI
provided information that was used to obtain the warrant for the October 25 search
and, if so, whether drugs were found when the warrant was executed. 6 Defense
counsel did not.
B.

The trial court properly denied Defendant's motion asking
that the prosecutor be compelled to produce all probable cause
affidavits and warrant returns on searches between January
2006 and January 2007.

Defendant next asked the trial court to compel the prosecutor to produce all
probable cause affidavits and warrant returns on searches of his residence between
January 2006 and January 2007. R159-60. Defendant again reasoned that (a) the
documents might provide evidence that some of the searches did not result in
charges, (b) the charges might not have been filed because drugs were not found,
(c) if drugs were not found and if the CI had sworn that he had seen them on the
premises, their absence might suggest that he had lied, and (d) if he had lied when

6

Indeed, Detective Troxell, who had been investigating Defendant even
before the CI contacted the Major Crimes Force, testified at sentencing about
warrants that were executed on Defendant's premises, where drugs were not found.
See R298:8.

15

he swore to an affidavit, he might have lied when he said he bought drugs from
Defendant in the five controlled buys. R297:17-18.
Background. The trial court had already noted that copies of search affidavits
and returns for searches executed before December 2006 would not likely be
available. See R297:16. As explained, the Fourth District's record keeping of these
matters was deficient at the time. See id. The Utah Supreme Court's decision in
Anderson, which required the court to keep records of search warrants and their
accompanying affidavits and returns, did not issue until December 2006, more than
eleven months into the thirteen-month period for which Defendant requested
records.
Moreover, the trial court explained, even if the records existed and could be
found, Defendant had shown no likelihood that the documents would be relevant or
exculpatory. Rather, the court observed, "There are myriad[] ... reasons for which
charges could not or would not be filed/' including the decision not "to burn your
CI." R297:18. Accordingly, the trial court ruled, "So I don't find that trying to come
up with any and all other probable cause affidavits that have to do with this
residence would be instrumental in determining credibility or lack of credibility on
the part of the CI." Id.
Indeed, as the trial court explained, any information could only lead to a trial
within a trial as to whether the search documents showed anything at all. "What, in
16

the end, you would have to do in order to go anywhere with this, is to put someone
from the County Attorney's Office on the stand to explain why the charges weren't
filed, or someone from Major Crimes Task Force to explain why the charges weren't
filed." R297:18. The court concluded that the probative value of any resulting
evidence would be outweighed by the danger of undue delay and waste of time,
and therefore inadmissible under Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. See R297:18.
Thus, because the documents alone, if any existed, would not show
"credibility or lack of credibility on the part of the CI," the trial court denied the
motion to compel the prosecutor to produce them.
Surviving alternative basis for trial court's decision. Defendant challenges
the trial court's denial of his request that the prosecutor be required to produce all
probable cause affidavits and warrant returns on searches of his residence between
January 2006 and January 2007. Defendant has argued that the documents might be
relevant because they might show that searches based on some of the warrants may
not have resulted in charges. Defendant has thus challenged the trial court's ruling
that the documents were not sufficiently relevant to require a motion to compel. Br.
Appellant at 17.

But, once again, he has not addressed the trial court's

determination that the pre-Anderson v. Taylor documents could not likely be located.
Thus, an unchallenged basis survives to support the trial court's ruling, and this

17

Court need not address the relevancy issue. See State v. Montiel, 2004 UT App 242, ^
20; Baker, 963 P.2d at 810.
Merits. In any event, the trial court properly exercised its discretion. As
explained, most of the materials requested by Defendant, if they had once existed,
were likely unavailable due to deficiencies in the Fourth District's retention
procedures. See R297:16. And, as the trial court observed, Defendant had only
speculated that the material requested might contain some information possibly
relevant to the CI's credibility. Defendant had not shown that the evidence would
be exculpatory. See Pliego, 1999 UT 8,112 (requiring disclosure only of material
known to the prosecutor that would be exculpatory or helpful to the defense). The
trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that the probative value of any
possibly relevant evidence would have been outweighed by the danger of undue
delay and wasted time required to show why charges were not filed following the
various searches. See R297:18. And the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when, under these circumstances, it denied Defendant's motion to compel discovery
of any January 2006 to January 2007 affidavits.
Harmlessness. Moreover, Defendant has not shown that he suffered any
harm as a result of the trial court's ruling. Nothing in this record suggests that

18

Arthur Allred provided affidavit evidence to support any search warrants issued
during the January 2006 through January 2007 period.
Moreover, as explained under Point A., above, on cross-examination of
Officer Troxell about the investigation of Defendant, defense counsel could have
about any other searches on Defendant's residence conducted during that period,
including whether Arthur Allred provided the affidavit testimony to support the
warrant, and whether any drugs were found. She did not.
Thus, even had the documents been relevant to the CI's credibility, any harm
Defendant might have suffered resulted from defense counsel's decision not to ask
about them, not from the trial court's decision to deny discovery.
C The trial court properly denied Defendant's motion asking
that the prosecutor be compelled to produce "text copies" of
the Utah County Major Crimes Task Force procedures for
controlled buys and for using voluntary or paid confidential
informants.
Defendant's third and fourth requests were that the court compel the
prosecutor to produce "text copies" of the Utah County Major Crimes Task Force
7

In fact, Officer Troxell testified that neither he nor the Major Crimes Force
had any dealings with Arthur Allred until July or August 2006. See R288:64-65. This
suggests that Allred could not have provided any affidavit testimony to the Major
Crimes Task Force from January 2006 until July 2006, the first half of the period for
which documents were requested.

19

procedures for controlled buys and its procedure for using voluntary or paid
informants. See R158; R297:ll-12. The trial court properly exercised its discretion to
deny that request.
Background. At argument on Defendant's motion to compel, the parties
addressed the requested "text copies/' Defense counsel stated that she wanted
the copies "to see if they [the task force members] had actually followed their
procedures." R297:ll. The Court asked what difference that would make. Id.
Defense counsel replied, "I think it does go to the credibility of Officer Trox[e]ll,
as he signed his oath that... [Defendant] was actually working off charges."
R297:12. "The other part is ... that I would just like to know if they followed the
procedure for ... using confidential informants in controlled buys." Id.
The prosecutor responded, "There is no text copy of controlled buys, the
procedures, or for using confidential informants for major crimes, as far as I know.
I've spoken with Sergeant Trox[e]ll about that to find out, and he said that there was
no written procedure." R297:14.
In addition, as the prosecutor explained, defense counsel would have the
opportunity to elicit any relevant information about the procedures during crossexamination at trial. To prove his case at trial, the prosecutor would have to lay a
"foundation for how the controlled buys [went] down" and "explainf] to the jury
why we had the informant there, and how the process went, and how we know that
20

it was drugs that were purchased in the house, and not drugs that he carried with
him/7 R297:14. Defense counsel, during cross-examination on these matters, would
have the opportunity to "ask any questions she'd like about the process he follows/'
Id. Thus, she could reach her questions about whether the officers followed any
required procedures during cross-examination.
The trial court denied Defendant's motion for text copies of the procedures.
In ruling on the motion, the court relied on the prosecutor's statement that no
written copies existed. R297:18-19. Moreover, the court explained, even if the
written copies did exist, the court would not likely have granted the motion to
compel the prosecutor to produce them. "This is not a trial of how the Major Crimes
Task Force sends out its CI's, and how they pay them, or whether they are
voluntary." R297:19. The court continued, "granting the motion to compel on those
issues wouldn't get us anywhere." Id. "It's going to come down to the testimony
offered, probably by the CI, and any support and corroboration that's offered by the
officers who were there, and if your client decides to testify against his credibility."
Id.
Adequate briefing. Defendant has not addressed the court's ruling or
reasoning for denying his request that the prosecutor produce the written
procedures. See Br. Appellant at 12-18. Thus, to the extent he challenges the trial
court's denial of his motion to compel their production, his claim is inadequately
21

briefed. See Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, f 14,194 R3d 903 ("Since an appeal is a resort
to a superior court to review the decision of a lower court, Utah appellate rules
require the appellant to address reasons why the district court's [decision] should be
overturned/').
Merits. In any event, the trial court properly denied Defendant's request for
"text copies" of the procedures. As explained, the prosecutor stated that no written
copies existed.

R297:14. Defendant did not counter that statement.

See id.

Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that such written procedures did exist.
And, in addition, "text copies" of the procedures were not relevant to the
issues before the court. As the court explained, "This [wa]s not a trial of how Major
Crimes Task Force sends out its CI's, and how they pay them, or whether they're
voluntary." R297:19. Rather, the issue in this case was whether Defendant had sold
drugs to the CI on the five charged dates. Id.
Harmlessness. Finally, as explained, even had the procedures been relevant,
Defendant did not need written copies to address their relevance. As the prosecutor
explained, he would need to lay foundation as trial about how Officer Troxell
interacted with the CI and how the controlled buys proceeded. See R297:14.
Defendant would then be free to cross-examine Officer Troxell about any of these
matters and elicit any relevant information about the procedures employed. See id.
And, at trial, the prosecutor did lay the necessary foundation by asking Officer
22

Troxell about the use of the confidential informant and the conduct of the controlled
buys. See R288:64-93. But, on cross examination, defense counsel did not ask about
the task force's procedures. See R288:104-24.
Thus, Defendant suffered no harm when the trial court denied his motion to
compel discovery of "text copies" of the Major Task Force's procedures on
confidential informants and controlled buys. Counsel could have inquired about
the task force's procedures, but apparently chose not to do so.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted June J9\ , 2010.
MARKL. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

< ANNE B. INOUYE

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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Rule 16. Discovery.
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the defense upon request the following material or
information of which he has knowledge:
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefendants;
(2) the criminal record of the defendant;
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant;
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or
mitigate the degree of the offense for reduced punishment; and
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause shown should be made available to the defendant
in order for the defendant to adequately prepare his defense.
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable following the filing of charges and before the defendant
is required to plead. The prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure.
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose to the prosecutor such information as required
by statute relating to alibi or insanity and any other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause shown
should be made available to the prosecutor in order for the prosecutor to adequately prepare his case.
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclosures at least ten days before trial or as soon as
practicable. He has a continuing duty to make disclosure.
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may make disclosure by notifying the opposing party
that material and information may be inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable times and places. The prosecutor
or defense may impose reasonable limitations on the further dissemination of sensitive information otherwise subject to
discovery to prevent improper use of the information or to protect victims and witnesses from harassment, abuse, or undue
invasion of privacy, including limitations on the further dissemination of videotaped interviews, photographs, or
psychological or medical reports.
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that discovery or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred,
that limitations on the further dissemination of discovery be modified or make such other order as is appropriate. Upon
motion by a party, the court may permit the party to make such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written
statement to be inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief following such an ex parte
showing, the entire text of the party's statement shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made
available to the appellate court in the event of an appeal.
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to
comply with this rule, the court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit
the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems just under the
circumstances.
(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may be required to:
(1) appear in a lineup;
(2) speak for identification;
(3) submit to fingerprinting or the making of other bodily impressions;
(4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the crime;
(5) try on articles of clothing or other items of disguise;
(6) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, fingernail scrapings, and other bodily materials which can be obtained
without unreasonable intrusion;
(7) provide specimens of handwriting;
(8) submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body; and
(9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the time of the alleged offense. Whenever the personal
appearance of the accused is required for the foregoing purposes, reasonable notice of the time and place of such
appearance shall be given to the accused and his counsel. Failure of the accused to appear or to comply with the
requirements of this rule, unless relieved by order of the court, without reasonable excuse shall be grounds for revocation of
pre-trial release, may be offered as evidence in the prosecutor's case in chief for consideration along with other evidence
concerning the guilt of the accused and shall be subject to such further sanctions as the court should deem appropriate.
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P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on October 10, 2007)

3

THE COURT: Okay, let's go to the Tanner matter, then.

4

All right. We're here for part two of the oral arguments tnat

5

we started this morning until I decided I really needed to read

6

the search warrant affidavit.

7

and for the record, this is State vs. Michael Tanner, our file

8

07 ending in 564.

9

cause affidavit that was signed —

10

I have now been provided with

—

For the record, I have read the probable
it looks to me like Judge

McVey, on October the 18th, 2006 at 1:40 in the afternoon.

11

All right, so I now have, I think, more of a clue as

12

to what's going on, at least with this affidavit.

13

had the chance to look at that, why don't you start over again,

14

Ms. Gonzales.

15

So having

MS. GONZALES: Your Honor, the reason that the defense

16

is ask —

17

that search warrant that was signed on October 18th, is because

18

that the State is relying —

19

upon the credibility of the CI, and the CI statements made to

20

the officers of the Utah County Major Crimes Task Force.

21

is requesting the return on the search warrant, for

the State's case actually depends

In particular, the CI has said that he alleges he was

22

inside Mr. Tanner's house and that he purchased methamphetamine

23

from Mr. Tanner, and there was stored methamphetamine in a

24

computer desk and under the bed.

25

However —

THE COURT: And that's within 72 hours of the 18th?
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MS. GONZALES: Right.

2

THE COURT: October 18th, when this search warrant was

3

signed, right?

4

MS. GONZALES: Yes, your Honor.

5

THE COURT: From paragraph 7?

6

MS. GONZALES: Uh-huh.

7

THE COURT: So that would make it up to three days

8

before, which would be the 15th to the 18th, which, if I figure

9

it right, is right between Counts VI and VII in time. Okay.

10

MS. GONZALES: Yes, your Honor.

11

THE COURT: That's a pretty narrow time period.

12

MS. GONZALES: And your Honor, I —

13

to see is if that computer desk was even —

14

don't even know if that was actually there. We never — we

15

don't —

16

warrant.

17

the bed and found anything.

18

what we would like
even existed. We

we don't see what was on the return of the search
We don't see if they —

if they even looked under

I think, what's even more telling is that Mr. Tanner

19

was —

20

after the search.

21

Mr. Tanner, it seems whatever information this confidential

22

informant was giving to the police officers, it doesn't seem

23

that it was reliable, if he wasn't even charged with anything

24

after those searches.

25

charges were never brought against Mr. Tanner, even
So since charges weren't brought against

I would like to see where the officers looked, if they
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actually did search that computer desk, i f they even found a

2

computer desl£ there, i.£ they looked under the bed; and what

3

anything

'

±f

they found.

4

THE COURT: So your assumption is that i.f th ey did find

5

something in the computer disk on the return on the warrant
i
/ is

6

going to list such and such found in computer dejsk?

7

MS. GONZALES: Yes.

8

THE COURT: All right.

9

MS. GONZALES: Okay, and we don't even -

So if —

10

THE COURT: -- hang on.

11

MS. GONZALES: Oh, okay, sorry.

12

THE COURT: Hang on. Yeah.

13

MS. GONZALES: Okay.

14

THE COURT: So if nothing is found in the computer

15

desk, and the computer desk is not even mentioned, how does

16

that effect the credibility?

17

can be gone from a desk.

In 72 hours, obviously, something

18

MS. GONZALES: But is that desk even actually there?

19

THE COURT: Well --

20

MS. GONZALEZ: Is there actually a computer desk there?

21
22
23
24
25

Are there scales or —
THE COURT: —

and I'm not sure that the return on the

warrant's going to verify that for you.
MS. GONZALES: But I don't see how it would hurt,
either, if we got the return on the warrant —
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THE COURT: Uh-huh.

2

MS. GONZALES: — because we could see —

we could —

3

then we'd be able to see is there exculpatory evidence in this.

4

I don't see what —

5

return on the search warrant.

6

how it would hurt the State to give us that

THE COURT: Okay, and so then depending on what the

7

search warrant tells you, you think it gives you knowledge

8

and evidence that you can use to attempt to impeach the CI,

9

who I take it is the most important witness for all of these

10

transactions?

11

MR. NIELSON: Yes, ma'am.

12

THE COURT: Okay.

All right, I think I understand the

13

argument there.

14

you have here for all other probable cause affidavits, that

15

would be relevant.

Now, explain to me why under the request that

16

MS. GONZALES: Okay.

17

THE COURT: You're talking about a year period from

18

January 2006 to 2007.

19

I don't think anything that's in this Amended Information goes

20

to 2007, does it?

21

bit into February.

22
23

Why would 2007 be important at all, when

Oh, to February.

Okay, so it goes a little

MS. GONZALES: Just a slight bit, yes.

It's the second

month.

24

THE COURT: Okay.

25

MS. GONZALES: Your Honor, we are asking for that
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because in the totality of the circumstances this was an

2

ongoing investigation that had been going on for a long time;

3

and these alleged buys, of course, did not occur in a vacuum.

4

This was in an ongoing investigation.

5

know —

6

information to the Utah County Major Crimes Task Force for

7

the other searches, where Mr. Tanner was —

8

brought against him either, after those searches, it stands

9

to reason, your Honor, that there must be exculpatory evidence,

If —

which we don't

if this CI is the same person that's giving the

charges weren't

10

from what —

11

Crimes Task Force used in order to obtain those search

12

warrants; and then going in the home on the search, after

13

receiving —

14

into the house, and nothing seems to be found.

15

to know what information they were basing the search on.

16

from the information that the Utah County Major

after receiving permission to search, they go
So I would like

THE COURT: I'm not making it there; and it's going to

17

be exculptaory and applicable to the dates of October 3rd, 6th,

18

12th, 19th, 24th of 2006 because if on all of these other alleged

19

searches —

20
21

MS. GONZALES: If it is —

if it's the same CI, your

Honor.

22

THE COURT: If it's the same CI —

23

MS. GONZALES: That's what we could like to know.

24

THE COURT: -- and on all the alleged searches, they

25

found nothing that would be exculptaory, and would prove that

~7~
1

one these certain dates —

2

MS. GONZALES: Well, I think —

3

THE COURT: Please don't interrupt me —

4

MS. GONZALES: Okay, I'm sorry.

5

THE COURT: Okay, I'm trying to work this out. I'm

I'm sorry, your Honor.

So help me think.

So your

6

trying to follow your head, okay?

7

theory is that, number one, you want to find out if the CI's

8

the same guy.

9

they didn't find anything on all of those searches, that would

10

be exculpatory evidence, and would tend to prove that the CI's

11

lying, and therefore he's lying on all of these charges that

12

happened later.

Number two, if they found anything, because if

Is that about it?

13

MS. GONZALES: That's about it, your Honor.

14

THE COURT: Okay.

15

MS. GONZALES: Also, also the CI —

on the probable

16

cause affidavit that was signed on October 18th, Officer Troxall

17

says that the CI's working off charges.

18

me that the CI wasn't working off charges, which were approved,

19

and he says they were approved.

20

were approved by the County Attorney's Office.

21

told me that he wasn't working off any charges, but I would

22

like that in writing also.

23

I would like —

The State has informed

These charges to be worked off

That's the —

Mr. Nielson's

and which goes to —

24

THE COURT: On the record's not good enough?

25

MS. GONZALES: Excuse me?
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THE COURT: On the record's not good enough?

2

MS. GONZALES: I didn't —

3

outside.

4

just want to put it on the record.

5

THE COURT: Okay.

6

I don't remember him telling me on the record.

charges, as far as you know

—

MR. NIELSON: Your Honor --

8

THE COURT: —
Attorney's office?

10

So I

Mr. Nielson, was the CI working off

7

9

I remember him telling me

with the approval of the Utah County

That's the operative line.

MR. NIELSON: Judge, I have no documentation on that

11

with me today.

12

in front of me.

13

the confidential informant.

14

was convicted of a crime; and it's my understanding that he

15

offered, around the sentencing of that crime, to provide

16

information about drug dealing, and worked as a CI for the

17

Major Crimes Task Force.

18

Attorney's Office referred him over to Major Crimes for them

19

to use as they felt was appropriate.

20

It wasn't in the motion to compel that I have
This is what I recall of the situation with
He had been charged with a crime,

It was the end of 2006 the County

They have the informant's name, the approximate dates.

21

They can check and see what he was charged with in the Court's

22

records, and what he actually ended up pleading to, to see what

23

happened.

24

was held off in exchange for the CI doing anything for the

25

County; and Major Crimes wasn't letting him work off charges

As far as I know, there has never been a case that
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instead of sending him to the County for screening, because the

2

County Attorney's Office was the one that pointed him over to

3

Major Crime's direction to work.

4

So I think that by checking the Court records,

5

Ms. Gonzales can find out what he'd been charged with and

6

what he plead to.

7

that.

8

for that information.

9

I don't have any further information beyond

I guess I could start off the same place as her to look

THE COURT: Okay, you don't have anything in your files

10

that shows that some special consideration was recommended to

11

the Judge at the time of sentencing?

12

MR. NIELSON: I don't, Judge.

13

THE COURT: Okay.

14

MR. NIELSON: That's not something that we'd know.

15

That's something that usually gets pulled up to then bench and

16

is taken, you know —

17

Judge.

you'd probably know —

in front of the

I just don't have those details.

18

MS. GONZALES: I was — well, your Honor, it was just

19

that the statement in that probable cause affidavit is — was

20

that the County Attorney's Office had already approved that

21

his charges could be worked off; but it sounds to me that the

22

County Attorney's Office had not approved it, but referred the

23

matter over later.

24

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

25

MR. NIELSON: T h a t ' s j u s t t h e way I u n d e r s t o o d i t .

I

-10addressed the issue with Mr. Buhman last week; and that was
the best of our recollection as to it, but we weren't able to
3

I locate any documentation on it at that point, but then we

4

didn't do a detailed search either into the computer records

5

or anything.

6

So I think that he had —

if it serves what people

7

told me, if it's correct, that it was something like a forgery

8

case that he had been charged with.

9

THE COURT: What more do you want?

10
11

MS. GONZALES: I just wanted to know if they had
actually approved

—

12

THE COURT: Well --

13

MS. GONZALES: —

14

THE COURT: —

15

MS GONZALES: Hasn't said --

16

MR. NIELSON: I don't know anything

17

MS. GONZALES: —

18

MR. NIELSON: —

his charges to be worked off.

sounds like not.

—

it sounds like.
further than that.

So I —- from

19

what —

the way I understood it, he didn't start working for

20

anything for major crimes until after his other case had been

21

settled; and I don't believe he's been in trouble with any

22

cases since then.

23

THE COURT: Okay.

24

MS. GONZALES: Which case?

25

MR. NIELSON: I don't think he's had a new case since
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then.

I don't think he's had any new violations of the law.

2

MS. GONZALES: Since working —

3

THE COURT: Since being put on —

4

THE COURT: In October?

5

MR. NIELSON: I would assume that he's probably on

6

Court probation or AP&P probation, based on his previous cases.

7

I don't think he's had any violations of those probations; but

8

again, that's not something I've researched on.

9

defendant on this case.

He's not the

10

MS. GONZALES: All right.

11

THE COURT: All right. Well, I think, that pretty well

12
13
14

resolves that one. Any other requests?
MS. GONZALES: No, your Honor, just that it —
know, I've —

you

no, I've covered everything, I think. Yeah.

15

THE COURT: Well, you also asked for a copy of their

16

procedure for controlled buys, and a copy of their procedure

17

for using voluntary or paid confidential informants. Are you

'18

withdrawing that —

19

those two requests?

MS. GONZALES: No, your Honor, it was —

I wanted the

20

text copy for the confidential informants to see if they had

21

actually followed their procedure —

22
23
24
25

THE COURT: What difference would it make?
'MS. GONZALES: —

and the —

well, your Honor, to me it

makes a difference.
THE COURT: Is it a violation of the law if'they don't?
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' MS. GONZALES: No, but I think it does go to the

2

credibility of Officer Troxall, as he signed his oath that

3

this is that he was actually working off charges that had

4

already been approved by the County Attorney.

5

The other part is, your Honor, that I would just like

6

to know if they followed the procedure for the —

7

— using confidential informants in controlled buys.

for the confi

8

THE COURT: What difference would that make at trial?

9

MS. GONZALES: I just —

I wanted to see if —

well, I

10

don't know what the procedure is.

11

procedure is; and then that way, if they have to rely more on

12

just statements that this CI is making, because at trial this

13

— basically, these are just statements that the CI has made.

14

The officers hadn't witnessed any — much of anything.

I would like to see what the

15

THE COURT: Okay. All right, anything else?

16

MS. GONZALES: No, ma'am.

17

THE COURT: Okay.

18

MR. NIELSON: Yes, ma'am.

Mr. Nielson?
Your Honor, in regards

19

to No. 1 in the request, I, first of all, don't think it's

20

relevant.

21

that's what the search warrant is, is an authorization to

22

search the house '— was authorized October 18th.

23

A search of the house that was authorized —

and

The house wasn't actually searched until October 25th.

24

Had we charged somebody with a crime from stuff that we'd found

25

on October 25th, defense Counsel would be in here saying that

1

the information in the warrant was step.

2

relevant in that point.

3

So I think it's not

It also, even if nothing was found in the house, it

4

doesn't mean that he didn't sell drugs to the informant on

5

those days.

6

forward, that he had the drugs there on those days.

We have the proof, and we're comfortable going

7

From the 18th to the 25th,. he could have —

8

was the day they got the warrant, and then he'd been in the

9

house days before that —

and that

he could have sold the drugs, used

10

the drugs, or anything else.

11

bring to Court of him using drugs there at the computer desk,

12

and the State would be more than happy to put on that evidence,

13

if the Counsel would like, to show that —

14

explanation of why the drugs are no longer there.

15

We do have proof that we could

that could be an

There's also issues about searches of the house.

When

16

the police officer searched the house, sometimes people hide

17

stuff well, and we just can't find it.

18

other reasons why the County Attorney's Office or Major Crimes

19

decided they didn't want to act on those search warrant —

20

the information they obtained during that search.

21

There may have been

or

It's just not relevant to what was bought, the drugs

22

that were purchased on the dates in question.

It would only

23

be relevant if it was going to something that we were charging

24

with for finding his house on that day.

25

him with anything at that time.

We chose not to charge

-141 I

For No. 2, it's just expanding number —

Count I to a

2

wider range of time.

3

house.

4

appropriate; and I think we've turned all of the February

5

search warrant information over to defense Counsel, for them

6

to prepare for the February charges.

7

for February that's missing.

8
9

The February charges were a search of his

So I would agree. A search warrant for February is

I'm not aware of anything

In regards to Nos. 3 and 4, it's the same response
for both of those.

There is no text copy of control buys,

10

the procedures, or for using confidential informants for major

11

crimes, as far as I know.

12

about that to find out, and he said that there was no written

13

procedure.

14 I

I've spoken with Sergeant Troxall

So Ms. Gonzales will be able to, on cross, ask any

15

questions she'd like about the process that he follows. I'en

16

sure that is something that will be coming out on direct, when

17

we're laying a foundation for how the controlled buys go down,

18

and explaining to the jury why we had the informant there, and

19

how the process went, and how we know that it was drugs that

20

were purchased in the house, and not drugs that he carried in

21

with him or anything like that.

22

turn over for No. 3 and 4 that I was able to locate.

So there is no text copy to

23

THE COURT: Any last words?

24

MS. GONZALES: No, your Honor, except for the offering

25

of proof that Mr. Tanner uses drugs. Would that offer of proof
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be from the search of his house on February 2007?

2

MR. NIELSON: Yes, it would.

3

MS. GONZALES: Your Honor, that goes to the trial that

4

we —

that's been severed.

5

to do with this case.

6

I don't believe that has anything

MR. NIELSON: Well, if you want to say —

there's no

7

reason —

8

possible conclusion is that he's not a drug dealer.

9

other explanations for that. We have proof of other ways the

10

that if there's no drugs in the house, the only

drugs have left the house.

11

MS. GONZALES: That's not what I'm saying.

12

is to —

13

Major Crimes Task Force.

14

There's

My reason

is the CI credible in the statements that he made to

THE COURT: All right.

I turn to Rule 16 of the Utah

15

Rules of Criminal Procedure, subparagraph (a), I find that

16

subparagraph's (a)(1), (2), (3) don't really apply here.

17

We're looking at either (a)(4), "Evidence known to the

18

prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused,"

19

exculpatory.

20

or mitigate the degree of offense for the reduced punishment,"

21

and (a)(5) —

22

the Court determines on good cause shown should be made

23

available to the defendant in order for the defendant to

24

adequately prepare his defense.

25

"Evidence mitigate the guilt of the defendant,

excuse me —

"Any other items of evidence which

So, let's look at these one by one. No. 1, a copy of
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the return of search warrant affidavit for the search warrant

2

issued on October 18th, 2006 on the residence of 375 West 300

3

North, in Provo, Utah.

4

My understanding from the parties is that the search

5

warrant, obviously, has been provided, because I was finally

6

given a copy of it, and, for the record, that's the search

7

warrant that was signed on October 18th, by Judge McVey.

8

think the stipulation of the parties has been that it was

9

executed on the 25th, week later.

I note, that the search

10

warrant was signed in between two of the dates that are

11

involved in this trial.

12

I

The Counts that are being tried are Counts IV through

13

VIII.

We've severed the other three.

14

sorry, Count's IV, V, and VI, occurred on October 3rd, 6th,

15

and 12th, VII and VIII occurred on the 19th and 20th.

16

search warrant was signed in between the dates, but was not

17

served until after the last date.

18

Count's III —

I'm

So the

So I turn to relevance and whether or not there's good

19

cause under Rule 16 for me to grant this motion to compel as

20

to the first request.

21

anybody can find a copy of the return on the warrant, since I

22

think —

23

down, and when it was we started keeping all of these things

24

down in the clerk of the Court's office.

25

Mr. Nielson: It was after this.

Frankly, the real question is whether

I can't remember when the Anderson came —

case came

We've tried to locate
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it.

2

THE COURT: That's what I thought.

So I'm not sure the

3

Court has one.

4

we can find it either, because in those days there wasn't an

5

organized way of doing it.

6

If you haven't found it here, I don't know that

At any rate, I am not persuaded that the return on

7

the warrant is relevant to the dates in Counts IV through VIII,

8

which are now set for trial.

9

a computer desk can be testified to by the CI, and any other

The fact that there was or wasn't

10

officers that have gone through executions of search warrants

11

there.

12

Whether or not there were drugs in that computer desk

13

on the 25th, which is after these dates, becomes irrelevant, in

14

my estimation.

The defendant could have used them, he could

15

have sold them.

They might not have ever been there, but I

16

don't think finding —

17

the warrant, helps us at all with any of the issues that are

18

relevant to this case.

19

compel on that issue.

20

if it could be found —

the return on

So I'm going to deny the motion to

As to the No. 2 request, which is a copy of any and

21

all other probable cause affidavits, in support and application

22

for search warrant, return of search warrant affidavits for

23

this residence for the dates of January 2006 through January

24

2007.

25

Part of the argument here is that this would be
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exculpatory evidence, because these search warrants, apparently

2

—

3

the defendant or anyone else.

4

which charges could not or would not be filed.

and searches apparently didn't result in any charges against
There are myriads of reasons for

5

My experience as a prosecutor was there are many times

6

when you don't file the charges, because you don't want to burn

7

your CI. You decide in the end you'd rather keep using your

8

CI, than burn the CI by filing the charges.

9

case the charges weren't filed until February 9th, of 2007,

10
11

I note in this

which is some time after the October charges.
So I don't find that trying to come up with any and

12

all other probable cause affidavits that have to do with this

13

residence would be instrumental in determining credibility or

14

lack of credibility on the part of the CI.

15

What, in the end, you would have to do in order

16

to go anywhere with this, is to put someone from the County

17

Attorney's Office on the stand to explain why the charges

18

weren't filed, or someone from Major Crimes Task Force to

19

explain why the charges weren't filed.

20

2 and 3 analysis, this is a waste of the jury's time, and

21

it's not likely to bring us to evidence which is helpful or

22

admissible.

23

In terms of a 401,

So I deny the request on that basis.

As for a text copy of either the Major Crimes Task

24

Force procedure for controlled buys or the procedure for using

25

voluntary or paid confidential informants, the statement from
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the County Attorney Deputy, who is here, is that it doesn't

2

exist; and even if it existed, I most likely would not have

3

ordered it, or granted the motion to compel on those issues.

4

This is not a trial of how Major Crimes Task Force

5

sends out its CI's, and how they pay them, or whether they're

6

voluntary.

7

probably, by the CI, and any support and corroboration that's

8

offered by the officers who where there, and if your client

9

decides to testify against his credibility.

It's going to come down to the testimony offered,

Bottom line is,

10

the County Attorney's Office says they've checked with Major

11

Crimes, and they don't exists.

12

motion to compel on those issues wouldn't get us anywhere.

13

So my doing —

granting the

So with that, I deny the motion to compel; and that

14

takes us forward to the trial.

15

this needs to be entered.

16

have the State's proposed jury instructions.

17

you say last week that you were content with these, or are you

18

going to file your own?

19
20

25

Let's see, did

Honor.
THE COURT: Okay, and they have all the little nitpicky ones —

23
24

That came in just before lunch. I

MS. GONZALES: I was content with those, yes, your

21
22

I'll ask my clerk to enter —

oh, I'm still waiting for the double spaced —

MR. NEILSON: Your Honor, I have emailed those to your
clerk.
THE COURT: Okay.

-2 01

MR. NIELSON: If they weren't (inaudible) themselves,

2

THE COURT: So Travis should have them?

3

MR. NIELSON: Yes, ma'am.

4

THE COURT: Okay, and then I was going to say, we have

5

all the nit-picky ones about —

okay, there are the elements

6

I mean the intent, different types of intent.

7

definition of what a drug-free zone is?

Do we have a

8

MS. GONZALES: I believe it is in there.

9

MR. NIELSON: I believe so.

10

—

I think I was pretty

detailed on that.

11

THE COURT: Okay, good.

12

at them.

13

the 16th, next Monday?

All right, we'll take a look

Then that takes us back to our trial date, which is

14

MS. GONZALES: Tuesday.

15

THE COURT: Tuesday.

16

MR. NIELSON: Tuesday, the 16th.

17

THE COURT: Right date, wrong day of the week.

Oh, that's right.

Okay,

18

so that'll be the 16th; and we'll have the jury here at 8:15.

19

I'm going to send my clerk out right now to —

20

think we need?

21

need any alternate jurors.

22

you can strike 4 each.

23

ought to be okay.

24

we had 3 or 4 not show — why don't we say 34, okay?

25

you send out 34.

It's a one day trial.

how many do you

So I don't think we'll

So in the end, we need 16, so that

I would really think if we had 30, we

That means we could loose 14. Although if
Why don't
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All right, I'll have my clerk get that out today.

2

MR. NIELSON: Judge, the reason it was cut down to a

3

one day trial is because there was the stipulation about chain

4

of custody for the drugs —

5

THE COURT: Okay.

6

MR. NIELSON: —

from the time they got to the police

7

officers to the time they got to the lab to be tested.

8

we'll have, as far as witnesses, the CI stating that he bought

9

the drugs; the police officers that handled him and took the

10

So

drugs; and then the crime lab that tested the drugs.

11

THE COURT: Okay.

12

MR. NIELSON: And the rest of the chain has been

13

stipulated to.

14

to quash the subpoenas duces tecum that were issued by the

15

defense; and I don't know if you've received that or not yet,

16

but it's kind of moot now, because the subpoenas were for

17

yesterday, and you've kind of ruled on all those issues.

18
19

Then, your Honor, the State filed a motion

THE COURT: I assumed that we were taking care of the
subpoenas duces tecum today.

20

MS. GONZALES: Yeah, I believed that.

21

MR. NIELSON: Okay.

22

THE COURT: All right, so I think that's resolved.

23

MR. NIELSON: Okay, just want to make sure everything's

24
25

cleared up.
THE COURT: Okay.

All right.

So is the stipulation

-221

still good as to the chain of custody?

2

MS. GONZALES: Yes.

3

THE COURT: All right, so we shouldn't have any problem

4

there.

I think, with that, any other witnesses that you want

5

there, you'd better bring in yourself —

6

MS. GONZALES: All right.

7

THE COURT: —

8

there.

9

MS. GONZALES: No, your Honor.

10
11

if there are any other officers you want

THE COURT: Just as long as I don't have to deal with
this at trial.

12

MS. GONZALES: I've given my witness list already.

13

THE COURT: He's told you who — maybe you'd better

14

name her the officers that you have coming.

15

MR. NIELSON: I have Mark Troxall and Bill Young.

16

THE COURT: Okay, so there —

17

MR. NIELSON: And then there's two guys from the crime

18

lab, because there were different people that tested the drugs.

19

One on like four of the dates, and one on the fifth, a separate

20

guy.

21
22
23
24
25

THE COURT: Any issues as to expert notice on the crime
lab?
MR. NIELSON: It's the State Crime Lab.
already on notice for that*
THE COURT: Okay.

So they were

-23MS. GONZALES: Yep, that's fine.
THE COURT: Okay.

Great, we'll see you then; and

you'11 take care of getting him appropriate clothing?
MS. GONZALES: Yes, ma'am.
THE COURT: All right.
(Hearing concluded)

Thank you.
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